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Abstract: This paper reports the results of a series of competitive labour market experiments in 
which subjects have the possibility to reciprocate favours. In the high stake condition subjects 
earned between two and three times their monthly income during the experiment. In the normal 
stake condition the stake level was reduced by a factor of ten. We observe that both in the high 
and the normal stake condition fairness concerns are strong enough to outweigh competitive 
forces and give rise to non-competitive wages. There is also no evidence that effort behaviour 
becomes generally more selfish at higher stake levels. Therefore, our results suggest that, 
contrary to common beliefs, fairness concerns may play an important role even at relatively high 
stake levels.  
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I. Introduction 
During the last decade economists and psychologists have gathered much evidence suggesting 
that concerns for fairness and reciprocity cannot be ignored in social interactions. This evidence 
and applications of recently developed theories of social preferences indicate that fairness 
concerns may help solving problems that have puzzled economists for a long time like, e.g., the 
persistence of non-competitive wage premia (Agell and Lundborg 1995, 2002; Bewley 1999, 
Campbell and Kamlani 1997), the possibility of involuntary unemployment (Fehr, Kirchsteiger 
and Riedl 1993, MacLeod and Malcomson 1998), the existence of inflation persistence (Driscoll 
and Holden 2001), the incompleteness of contracts (Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 2001), the 
allocation of property rights (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2000, 2001; Sonnemans, Oosterbeek 
and Sloof 2001), the conditions for successful collective action (Ostrom 2000) and the design of 
contracts (Fehr and Falk 2002, Englmaier and Wambach 2001).  
Since a considerable part of the evidence for the relevance of fairness concerns comes 
from questionnaire studies and from laboratory experiments sceptics sometimes dismiss this 
evidence by claiming that in real life the stakes involved are much higher than in laboratory 
experiments. Intuitively, it seems compelling to assume that fairness concerns become less 
relevant when the stakes are high. In addition, it has been frequently pointed out that in 
competitive environments deviations from rationality and self-interest are likely to be less 
important.1 Thus, perhaps the interaction between competitive markets and high stakes will 
render fairness concerns unimportant. Since we believe that these arguments should be taken 
seriously we conducted a series of competitive labour market experiments with relatively high 
stakes in which subjects had the possibility to reciprocate favours.  
To study the impact of variations in stake size we implemented a high stake condition, in 
which the subjects earned on average between two and three times their monthly incomes, and a 
normal stake condition, in which the subjects’ income opportunities were reduced by a factor of 
ten. To be able to finance these experiments we have conducted them in Moscow (Russia). Both 
in the high and the normal stake condition subjects participated in a so-called gift exchange 
experiment. Previous gift exchange experiments with stake levels that are typical for most 
laboratory experiments have shown that fairness concerns may lead to stable deviations from the 
competitive outcome (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993). In a gift exchange experiment wage 
formation takes place in a competitive experimental market and after a labour contract is 
concluded workers choose the effort level. Fairness concerns can, in principle, play a role in this 
environment because experimental workers can reciprocate to high wage offers with high effort 
                                            
1  "Claims about the irrelevance of models of rational choice and the consequent irrelevance of economics are 
not uncommon topics of conversation. ... If one looks at experimental markets for evidence, the pessimism is 
not justified. Market models based on rational choice principles do a pretty good job of capturing the essence 
of very complicated phenomena" (Plott 1986, p. 141). Smith (1991, p. 881) writes that markets "reinforce, 
even induce individual rationality”. Such claims are based on the remarkable tendency of competitive 
experimental markets (with no or little reciprocation opportunities) to converge to the competitive prediction 
that is derived from assumptions of full rationality and self-interest.  
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levels. Our experiment is designed such that selfish workers will never make reciprocal effort 
choices. Yet, if there are sufficiently many fair workers exhibiting reciprocal effort behaviour, 
paying high, non-competitive, wages may be profitable for the experimental employers. 
In contrast to common intuitions and beliefs the ten-fold increase in stake size has little 
impact on behaviour. We observe no differences in wages at the different stake levels. Both in 
the high and the normal stake condition experimental employers pay a substantial non-
competitive premium. Wages typically are three times higher than the wage that is predicted by 
the competitive model (based on the assumption of selfish subjects). Moreover, the increase in 
stake size also has little impact on workers’ effort behaviour. On average, workers in both stake 
conditions exhibit reciprocal effort choices that made it profitable for the employers to pay non-
competitive wages. There are small treatment differences in effort levels but the sign of these 
differences varies with the wage level. At relatively low wages effort is slightly higher in the 
high stake condition whereas at relatively high wages the reverse holds true. At intermediate 
wage levels the effort is the same across conditions. We believe that these findings are of interest 
for labour economists and people who are interested in the potential sources of involuntary 
unemployment and non-competitive wage premia because the gift exchange experiment captures 
the spirit of the fairness version of the efficiency wage theory (Akerlof 1982, Akerlof and Yellen 
1990).  
To examine potential peculiarities of our Russian subject pool we also conducted two 
further control experiments in the normal stake condition. In one control treatment we fixed the 
workers’ effort exogenously so that firms had no reason to worry about effort. In this condition 
the experimental employers did not shy away from paying very unfair wages that are close to the 
competitive level.2 Thus, whereas variations in stake size have no impact on wage formation 
institutional differences across markets, that is, whether effort is enforced exogenously, lead to 
radically different wage outcomes. In a second control experiment we observed the behaviour of 
Austrian subjects in the gift exchange condition. It turns out that wages as well as effort does not 
differ across the Russian and the Austrian subject pool. This suggests that there is nothing special 
about our Russian subjects, which strengthens our confidence in the potential generalisability of 
our high stake results across subject pools.  
There are some other papers that examined how a rise in stake size affects the role of 
fairness concerns in the ultimatum game.3 It is well known that the subgame perfect equilibrium 
in this game involves a strong earnings inequality if both players are selfish and rational. There 
                                            
2  It is sometimes argued that “fair” behaviour is driven by the fact that experimenters can observe subjects’ 
actions, i.e., that subjects do not want to appear greedy to the experimenter. However, experimental 
employers had little problems with appearing greedy in the condition with exogenous effort because they paid 
very low (unfair) wages. Thus, if subjects are concerned about appearing greedy, this concern seems to be 
easily overruled by other concerns.  
3  The ultimatum game is a bilateral bargaining game in which two players have to agree how to split a certain 
amount of money according to the following rules. The proposer makes one proposal of how to split the 
money. The responder can accept or reject this proposal. If she rejects both players get zero payoff. If she 
accepts the proposal is implemented.  
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exists by now a large body of experimental evidence, which contradicts this extreme prediction. 
(e.g. Güth and Tietz 1990; Roth 1995; Camerer and Thaler 1995). Typically, most proposers in 
the ultimatum game offer between 40 and 50 percent of the available money to the other party 
and responders reject low offers with high probability. Hoffmann, McCabe and Smith (HMS, 
1996) reported the results of ultimatum where they varied the stakes from $10 to $100. Their 
subjects were students at the University of Arizona. HMS found no significant differences in 
offers or rejection frequencies across stakes. In a more recent paper, Cameron (1999) examined 
the impact of very high stakes. In her experiments subjects could earn three months’ income in a 
one-shot high stake ultimatum game. In the normal stake condition the amount to be divided up 
between the bargainers is twenty times lower. She reports that the proposers’ behaviour is not 
affected by this large variation in stake size whereas the responders’ rejection rates are a bit 
lower in the high stake condition. Slonim and Roth (1997) observe a similar result although with 
a different twist. They repeat the ultimatum game ten times with different opponents. They 
observe that stake size variations initially do neither affect the proposers’ behaviour nor can they 
find significant differences in rejection frequencies. However, over time the responders exhibit a 
higher willingness to accept low offers, which induced the proposers to make lower offers.  
Our study differs from these papers because we examine the role of fairness concerns in 
the context of a competitive experimental market. In the absence of opportunities for 
reciprocation these markets have shown a remarkable tendency to converge towards the 
competitive prediction (Smith 1982, Plott 1989). This allows us to study whether the 
combination of competition and high stakes does diminish the role of fairness. Yet, as our results 
show, this is not the case. Our study also differs in another important way from the papers 
mentioned above. Whereas these papers examine the impact of high stakes on negative 
reciprocity, that is, the willingness to punish unfair behaviour, our paper examines the effect of 
high stakes on positive reciprocity – the willingness to reward fair (wage) behaviour. There is 
evidence from other experiments indicating that positive and negative reciprocity may be shaped 
by different motives (e.g., Offermann 1999). Like the experiments of Slonim and Roth (1997) we 
can also study whether there is an interaction effect between experience (i.e. repetition) and stake 
level because we also repeat the game ten times. Yet, in contrast to Slonim and Roth we do not 
find that the role of fairness diminishes over time in the high stake condition. Quite the contrary, 
compared to the normal stake condition, the role of fairness for workers’ effort behavior seems to 
increase over time in the high stake condition.  
Despite the different institutional set-up between our study and the research on stake size 
variations in the ultimatum game there are some common findings that deserve to be 
emphasized.4 First, except for Slonim and Roth (1997), all studies report that an increase in stake 
                                            
4  A very important qualification of this generalisation concerns the case of zero stakes. Cameron (1999) also 
conducted ultimatum games with hypothetical stakes. In these games proposer behaviour was very different 
compared to games were some real money was at stake. In particular, proposers made much lower offers in the 
hypothetical stake condition. Thus, our generalisation only applies to situations in which some money is at 
stake.  
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size does not affect the decisions of the first-movers in the sequentially played game. Second, to 
the extent to which stake size variations do affect the behaviour of second movers, the effects are 
remarkably small despite large – ten- or twenty-fold – increases in stake size. Even in those 
studies that report a stake size effect, there is no indication that fairness concerns play no longer a 
role if the stake size is increased up to three months’ income.  
The remainder of this paper is organized in three sections. In section II the experimental 
design is presented in some detail. Section III examines the data and Section IV summarizes our 
results. 
 
II. Experimental Design 
Since we are interested in the question whether, and to what extent, competitive markets with 
high monetary stakes reduce the role of reciprocal fairness our design has to have at least the 
following three features: (i) It should allow for the possibility of reciprocal fairness, that is, 
reciprocity should not be ruled out by the design. (ii) The trading institution should be a 
competitive experimental market and (iii) we need a high and a normal stake condition. The first 
two of these features are present in the so-called Gift-Exchange Market (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and 
Riedl 1993).5 Several experiments with Gift Exchange Markets (GEMs) indicate that fairness 
considerations have a substantial effect on subjects' wage and effort choices and give rise to 
stable non-competitive outcomes.6 The main purpose of this paper is to compare subjects’ 
behaviour in a Gift Exchange Market under normal and high stakes. Since the GEM constitutes 
the basic element of our experimental design we will next describe its features in more detail. 
Then we will describe an important control experiment, which we call the complete contracts 
markets (CCM).  
 
II. 1. The Gift Exchange Market (GEM) 
The GEM is an experimental labour market in which firms act as wage setters while workers 
have to determine their effort after they have accepted a wage offer.7 The GEM-design has two 
stages: At the first stage wages w are determined in a competitive one-sided oral auction in 
which each firm can publicly make wage proposals to a group of workers. Workers can accept 
these offers but they cannot make counteroffers. At the second stage those workers who have 
accepted a wage offer have to choose an effort level e. Both stages together constitute a period 
and, in general, there are several periods with identical experimental parameters. This stationary 
                                            
5  Akerlof (1982) interpreted labour contracts as a partial gift exchange. Our choice of labels for the major 
treatment conditions is based on Akerlof's notion of gift exchange. 
6  Charness (2000); Hannan, Kagel and Moser (1999); Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter (1998), Brandts 
and Charness (1999).  
7  We present the English translation of our GEM-instructions in the appendix.  
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repetition allows subjects to become acquainted with the trading institution. In addition, it 
enables us to study the potential convergence properties of the GEM. 
Notice, that in a one-sided oral auction firms cannot make an offer to a specific worker. 
Any worker can accept the offer and, once it is accepted, a labour contract is concluded. The 
auction stage has a pre-announced time limit. In our case the limit was three minutes. Within this 
time limit firms are free to revise their wage offers. The revision of offers has to obey the so-
called improvement rule, which is common to many different types of auctions. The 
improvement rule stipulates that, in a given period, any new wage offer has to be higher than the 
highest offer, which has not yet been accepted by a worker.8  
An essential feature of the GEM is that the labour contract does not stipulate the effort 
level. There is an exogenously given level of effort eo, which can be enforced by firms. Any e > 
eo is, however, not enforceable by means of economic incentives. This feature of the GEM is 
based on a view of the employment relation as a contractually incompletely regulated 
relationship. The view that labour contracts are rather incomplete and that imperfect enforcement 
technologies exclude the attainment of certain effort levels is by now widely recognized.9  
In our GEMs each firm can employ at most one worker and each worker can accept at 
most one wage offer in a given period. Once those workers who accepted a wage offer have 
chosen an effort level the period is over and a new one begins. In total, each GEM-session has 10 
periods. Firms' payoff function in experimental currency (Guilders) is given by 
(1) Π = (v – w)e,  
where v is an exogenously given redemption value. Workers' payoff function in experimental 
money (Guilders) is given by 
(2) U = w – c(e) – co.  
c(e) represents the effort cost function and obeys the conditions c(eo) = 0 and c’ > 0. co denotes 
an exogenously given level of fixed costs of working. In case that a subject does not trade his or 
her payoff is zero. 
The payoffs in experimental money are transformed into real money payoffs at the end of 
the experiment. The exchange rate between experimental money and real money is the same for 
                                            
8 Notice, that this rule does not rule out underbidding. Assume that the best wage offer is, for example, 60 while 
the second best offer is 50. A firm who wants to bid only 51, has to wait until 60 is accepted. Then it can offer 
51. 
9 In the textbook of P. Milgrom and J. Roberts (1992) we find, for example, the following paragraph (p. 329): 
"The employment contract is typically quite imprecise. The employees agree that – within limits that are rarely 
completely described and only partly understood – they will use their minds and muscles to undertake the tasks 
that the employer directs them to do, perhaps using the methods that the employer specifies. The employer 
agrees to pay the employees. The range of actions that might be requested or required is unclear. Future 
compensation and even the criteria used to determine future pay and promotions are unspecified. The 
mechanism to be used in case of dispute are not stated, nor are the penalties for most possible violations of the 
contract." 
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both workers and firms and it is common knowledge. To exclude the possibility of losses wage 
offers above v and below co are not allowed. The choice of payoff function (1) is also guided by 
the attempt to avoid losses. It is by now well known that behaviour may be affected by loss 
aversion.10 Since we want to rule out that the impact of reciprocal fairness is "polluted" by loss 
aversion phenomena we implemented payoff function (1) instead of the more familiar function Π 
= ve – w. As will be shown below, under the usual assumption of rational money maximizing 
agents, our choice of the payoff function does neither qualitatively nor quantitatively affect the 
behaviour of experimental subjects.  
 
II. 2. Treatment conditions 
The main purpose of this paper is to compare the behaviour of our Russian subjects under high 
and normal stakes GEMs. However, to rule out that potential peculiarities of Russian subjects 
are responsible for our results we perform two checks. First, we compare the behaviour of the 
Russian subjects with the behaviour of Austrian subjects under conditions of a normal stake 
GEM. More specifically, we compare the results of our normal stake GEM experiments with the 
GEM-experiments conducted by Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter (1998).11 Second, we 
run a so-called Complete Contracts Market (CCM) experiment with the Russian subjects in the 
normal stake condition. A CCM is similar to a GEM except that there are no possibilities for 
reciprocation because the effort level is exogenously fixed. Therefore, all phenomena in the 
GEM, which are due to the possibility of reciprocal effort choices should not be observed in the 
CCM. In Fehr et al. (1998) it has been shown that, in the case of an exogenously fixed effort 
level, non-competitive wages tend to vanish over time. It would thus be reassuring if the same 
happens among the Russian subjects. Our CCM also lasts for ten periods and wages are 
determined in a one-sided oral auction. As in the GEM a worker can accept at most one offer per 
period and a firm can employ at most one worker. 
Contrary to the GEM there is no effort stage in the CCM. e is set exogenously equal to 
one and no effort costs are subtracted from a worker's wage. In the CCM the payoff in terms of 
experimental money from a labour contract are, therefore, given by 
(1') Π = v – w 
(2') U = w – co 
                                            
10  For a summary see Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
11  For the purpose of this comparison our Russian instructions constitute a translation of the instructions used by 
Fehr et al. (1998). We applied the method of back translation. First, the instructions were translated from 
German into Russian. Then, a different person translated them back into German. If the back translation 
indicated a deviation from the original instructions the two translators together with a third translator and an 
experimenter had to clarify the issue. The experiments in Russia and Austria are based on the same parameters 
and information conditions. To control for experimenter effects both E. Tougareva and E. Fehr were present 
during the experiments in Austria and in Russia. 
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All other aspects of the CCM are identical to the GEM. 
 
II. 3. Information Conditions 
In the GEM as well as in the CCM the parameters v, co, c(e), the number of workers L, the 
number of firms N, the fact that there were ten periods and the exchange rate between 
experimental money and real money are common knowledge. At the beginning of each session a 
random mechanism determines whether a subject is a firm or a worker. Before the start of a ten-
period session a trial period is conducted in which no money is at stake. Before this trial period 
subjects have to solve several exercises in which they have to compute their own money payoffs 
as well as the money payoffs of their trading partner from hypothetical trades. 
Neither in the GEM nor in the CCM the subjects know the identity of their trading 
partner. To ensure this anonymity condition firms and workers are located in different rooms and 
the communication between these rooms takes place by means of a telephone. Because of the 
anonymity of trades no firm can signal workers that it is a high or a low wage firm. Nor can 
workers develop a reputation as high or low effort workers. It is also not possible that subjects 
punish or reward past actions of their current trading partners because they don’t know the 
identity or the past actions of their trading partners.  
All wage offers are public information. They are written on a blackboard in both rooms. 
As soon as a particular wage offer is accepted it is deleted from the blackboard. In addition, all 
other offers of the trading firm are also deleted because they are no longer available. Effort levels 
in the GEM are only known to the firm-worker pair who participates in a trade. In the GEM a 
worker does not know the effort levels of other workers. The reason for this is that we want to 
rule out group-pressure effects. These information conditions ensure that subjects can compute 
their own payoffs and the payoffs of their trading partners.  
 
II. 4. Parameters and Competitive Predictions 
In all GEMs and CCMs we set v = 120 and co = 20. The effort cost schedule in the GEMs is 
given by Table l. 
 
Table 1: Effort Cost Schedule 
Effort 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Cost 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
In the GEM as well as in the CCM there are always 9 workers and 6 firms. Due to this excess 
supply of workers the competitive wage for the CCM is given by wc = co = 20, in case that 
subjects exhibit exclusively selfish preferences. The competitive wage for the GEM is the same: 
For any given wage offer a rational money maximizing worker will always choose the lowest 
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effort because any other level would lower U. Since at e = 0.1 workers' reservation wages are 
given by co = 20 wages in the GEM and the CCM should not differ according to the competitive 
prediction.  
 
II. 5. Testing for the effects of high monetary stakes 
To study the effects of high monetary stakes we have conducted eight GEMs in Moscow. In four 
of these GEMs, denoted by s1-s4, the exchange rate between experimental Guilders and real 
money generated an income, which was comparable to the income earned by Austrian subjects in 
the GEM-experiments of Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter (1998). In the other four GEMs, 
which we denote by S1-S4, the exchange rate was increased by a factor of ten, i.e. subjects’ 
income opportunities in the "high stake" GEMs are ten times higher. 
We paid subjects in US Dollars. In the normal stake-GEM they received 2 US-cents per 
unit of experimental currency (Guilders) while in the high stake-GEM they received 20 cents. To 
increase the awareness of the exchange rate between Guilders and Dollars the exchange rate was 
noted at the top of each decision sheet. In our GEMs the maximum gains per trade were 100 
Guilders. Therefore, the maximum gains in terms of US-Dollars amount to $20. The median 
subject in our subject pool had a monetary income per month of slightly less than $17.12 64 
percent had a monetary monthly income of less than $20. On average, subjects earned between 
$40 and $50 in a high stake GEM-session. It is, thus fair to say that about two thirds of our 
subjects earned between 2 and 3 times their monetary monthly incomes in a two hour GEM-
session with high stakes. The experiments were conducted between March and May 1994. Four 
sessions (s1, s2, S1, S2) were organized in March, the other four (s3, s4, S3, S4) in May 1994.  
The monthly(!) Roubel inflation during the first half of 1994 varied between 9 and 22 
percent. As a consequence, the Dollar became a major store of value and a significant part of 
everyday transactions took place in Dollars. Due to the high Roubel inflation households tended 
to convert the money, which they did not need for immediate consumption purposes, as soon as 
possible into Dollars.13 Thus, knowledge of the Dollar-Roubel exchange rate was vital in these 
circumstances. Since virtually everybody could be expected to know the Roubel-Dollar exchange 
rate under these circumstances we considered the dangers of money illusion to be negligible if 
we paid subjects in Dollars.14 Taken together, it is reasonable to assume that subjects in the high 
                                            
12 We elicited information about subjects' income by a questionnaire before the starts of the first trading round. 
Subjects were asked to write down what they earn on average per month in each of the following income 
categories: (i) monthly student grant, (ii) salary in case of a permanent job, (iii) average income of occasional 
jobs, (iv) average income they get from parents or relatives, (v) income from other sources. They were asked 
to reveal their incomes truthfully. In order to give them an incentive for truthful revelation the questionnaire 
did not contain their names or their subject numbers. They filled out the questionnaire privately, put it into an 
unmarked envelope and threw it into a "voting" box. 
13 These exchange needs caused the existence of a large number of exchange offices. Banks made many 
advertisements for Dollar accounts and TV-News announced the exchange rate several times a day. 
14 We controlled for this kind of money illusion by asking subjects to compute the Roubel value of their dollar 
earnings at the end of the experiment. Many of them asked us which exchange rate they should take, those for 
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stake GEMs considered the potentially achievable gains per trade as a very large amount of 
money.15  
The comparison of outcomes between s1 - s4 on the one hand and S1 - S4 on the other 
hand allows an investigation of the effects of a rise in stakes. In case that we observe in both 
treatments a significant and similar amount of reciprocally fair behaviour the question arises 
whether this is due to a general inclination of Russian subjects to be fair or whether it is due to 
the possibility of reciprocal effort choices in the GEM. To discriminate between these hypotheses 
we organized four CCMs with normal stakes. The exchange rate between Guilders and real 
money in these CCMs was l Guilder = 4/3 Cents. This exchange rate provides subjects in the 
CCMs on average with the same overall income as in the normal stake GEMs. The same subjects 
who participated first in the normal stake GEMs were present in the CCMs, that is, the normal 
stake GEM and the CCM were part of the same overall session. The GEM always took place first 
and subjects did not know that after the GEM a CCM-experiment will take place. Moreover, 
subjects in the CCMs were in the same role as in the normal-stake-GEMs.  
 
 
III. Results 
In total 120 subjects participated in our Russian sessions. 60 subjects were present in the GEMs 
and CCMs of the normal stake sessions (s1 - s4) and 60 subjects participated in our high stake -
GEMs S1 - S4. All our subjects were first and second year undergraduates from a college, which 
provides mainly education for engineers. On average, a GEM lasted 1.5 - 2 hours while a CCM 
lasted approximately 45 minutes. The number of potential trades in each GEM as well as in each 
CCM is 60. Therefore, the total number of GEM-trades (CCM-trades) is 480 (240). The actual 
number of trades in the GEMs was 479 while in the CCMs it was 238. Our first main result deals 
with wage differences across the different treatments. 
 
Result 1: The wage is not affected by stake size. In contrast, the possibility of reciprocal effort 
choices in the gift exchange market has a large impact on wage levels.  
 
A first indication for R1 is provided in Figure 1, which shows the time pattern of average wages 
across treatment conditions for the Russian subjects. The figure shows that in all periods the 
average wage in the high and normal stake GEMs is very similar. This contrasts sharply with the 
                                                                                                                                            
buying Roubels or those for selling Roubels. There was no subject, which failed to do this exercise correctly. 
15  This view is further corroborated by a comparison of the monthly incomes of our experimental assistants, who 
where 30 years old adults with regular jobs at the Russian Academy of Sciences, with the experimental 
incomes of our subjects. Whereas subjects earned between $40 and $50 in a two-hour session our experimental 
assistants had a monthly income of roughly $30 and even this low income had not been paid to them for 
several previous months.  
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level and the time pattern of wages in the CCMs. Already in period 1 there is a large difference 
in wages across GEMs and CCMs. In addition, whereas wages in the CCMs slowly but steadily 
converge towards the competitive level of 20, wages in the GEMs even increase over time. 
Overall, in the CCMs 86 percent of all wages are below 40 whereas in the GEMs roughly 75 
percent of all wages are above 50. Figure 1 makes it already transparent that the institutional 
differences between the GEM and the CCM are much more important for wage formation than 
the stake differences across the GEM-treatments.  
R1 is also supported by formal statistical tests. A non-parametric Mann Whitney test 
with the average wage per session as the unit of observation indicates that the null hypothesis of 
equal wages across stake sizes cannot be rejected for the GEMs (p = 0.56). A regression of 
individual wages in the GEMs on a constant and a high stake dummy yields the same result. The 
high stake dummy has a coefficient of -.07 and a t-statistic of -.01 (p = .991).16 Thus, as 
suggested by Figure 1, stake size does not affect wage levels in the GEMs. In contrast to this, the 
wage difference across GEMs and CCMs is significant. The null hypothesis of equal wages 
across high stake GEMs and CCMs can be rejected (Mann Whitney test, average wage per 
session as unit of observation, p = 0.021).  
Previous Gift Exchange experiments (e.g., Fehr et al. 1998) have shown that the 
workers’ reciprocal effort behaviour is the driving force behind non-competitive wages because 
workers’ reciprocity makes it profitable for the firms to pay non-competitive wage premia. 
Therefore, the fact that wages are similar across stake conditions suggests that effort behaviour 
is also similar. Our next result sheds more light on this issue.  
 
Result 2: At low wages effort is higher in the high stake condition whereas at high wages effort 
is higher in the normal stake condition. The differences across stake conditions are, 
however, small and, often, insignificant.  
Support for R2 comes from Figure 2 and Table 2. Figure 2 shows how the average effort varies 
across different wage intervals. The figure indicates that in the wage intervals [35,49] and 
[50,64] effort is slightly higher in the high stake condition whereas for wages above 64 the 
reverse holds true. For wages at about 60 effort levels are the same across conditions. For each of 
the wage intervals in Figure 2 we have conducted Mann Whitney tests of the null hypothesis of 
equal effort levels across stake conditions. It turns out that only in the interval [35,49] effort 
levels are significantly different (p = .04).  
                                            
16  This t-statistic is based on robust standard errors taking into account the possibility that within-session wage 
observations may be dependent. Only across-session wage observations are treated as independent variables.  
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Figure 1: The Impact of Stake Size on Average Wages 
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Figure 2: The Impact of Stake Size on Effort Choices 
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To further explore differences in effort choices we ran several regressions (see Table 2). 
In all regressions displayed in Table 2 we computed robust standard errors that allow for 
dependent within-session observations. This procedure is necessary because the observations 
within a given session cannot assumed to be uncorrelated. Regression 1 relates individual effort 
on a constant, the worker’s wage, a high-stake dummy and an interaction term between the wage 
and the high-stake dummy. The coefficient on wages is highly significant and positive indicating 
a positive effort-wage relation in the normal stake condition. The high-stake dummy is also 
significantly positive suggesting that at lower wage levels subjects provide more effort in the 
high stake condition. The interaction term between wages and high stakes is significantly 
negative. The results of regression 1 imply that for wages sufficiently above 60 the effort tends 
to be higher in the normal stake condition.  
To check the robustness of this conclusion we also ran censored regressions that take 
into account that effort cannot be lower than 0.1 and higher than 1.17 Regression 2 shows that 
this changes the coefficients – reducing the constant and increasing the slope of the wage effort 
relation – but the main qualitative results described above remain unchanged. The inclusion of a 
quadratic wage term in regressions 3 and 4 also does not change our conclusions. The quadratic 
term is negative and, in equation 4, significant indicating that the effort-wage relations is 
concave. Yet, the results of regressions 3 and 4 also imply that at lower wages effort is higher in 
the high-stake condition whereas at wages above 60 effort is higher in the normal stake 
condition. 
In their paper on high stake ultimatum games Slonim and Roth (1997) find an interaction 
effect between experience and the stake level. During the final periods of the “repeated” 
ultimatum game subjects’ propensity to reject low offers is slightly lower in the high stake 
condition.18 This raises the question whether subjects are less willing to provide non-minimal 
effort levels in the final periods of our GEMs. To examine this question we have added a last 
period dummy and an interaction between “last period” and the high stake dummy to regressions 
1 and 2. The results of these regressions are displayed in equations 5 and 6 of Table 2. The table 
shows that – irrespective of whether we use OLS or the censored regression technique – the last 
period dummy and the interaction term are highly significant. However, the size of the 
coefficients is the opposite of what one might expect because in the last period effort is 
significantly higher in the high stake condition. This is indicated by the positive sign of the 
interaction term between last period and high stakes. The regressions also show that in the 
normal stake condition effort is lower in the final period but this effect is dominated by the 
interaction term: the absolute value of the coefficient on last period is smaller than the absolute 
value of the interaction term. To further explore this issue we also used dummies for period 9 
                                            
17  We also ran ordered probit regressions. They yield the same qualitative results as the OLS and the Tobit 
regressions.   
18  In Slonim and Roth subjects meet a new partner in every period. Thus, each ultimatum game is one-shot but 
they can still study the role of experience because subjects meet 10 different opponents.  
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and 10 or for period 8, 9 and 10 and interacted them with the high stake dummy. The results of 
these regressions are not shown in Table 2 because they always yield the same qualitative 
effects. In comparison with the normal stake condition effort is higher in the high stakes 
condition towards the end of the experiment.  
 
 
Table 2: The Impact of Stake Size on Effort Levels 
 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Censored 
Regression 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
Censored 
Regression 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
Censored 
Regression 
Constant 
 
-.2106*** 
(.0586) 
-.3917*** 
(.0546) 
-.3380* 
(.1575) 
-.7993*** 
(.1725) 
-.2098*** 
(.0569) 
-.3912*** 
(.0620) 
Wage 
 
.0094*** 
(.0011) 
.0120*** 
(.0010) 
.0143** 
(.0053) 
.0266*** 
(.0059) 
.0095*** 
(.0011) 
.0120*** 
(.0011) 
High Stake 
Dummy  
.2586*** 
(.0729) 
.3765*** 
(.0826) 
.2184** 
(.0841) 
.2855*** 
(.0765) 
.2571*** 
(.0719) 
.3743*** 
(.0835) 
High Stake × 
Wage 
-.0046** 
(.0015) 
-.0064*** 
(.0016) 
-.0038* 
(.0017) 
-.0046*** 
(.0016) 
-.0047** 
(.0015) 
-.0066*** 
(.0016) 
Wage 
Squared 
  -.00004 
(.00004) 
-.0001** 
(.00005) 
  
Last Period 
Dummy 
    -.0419*** 
(.0104) 
-.0482*** 
(.0149) 
High Stake × 
Last Period 
    .0877*** 
(.0225) 
.0957*** 
(.0258) 
Prob > F .0002  .0209  .0001  
Prob > Chi2  .0000  .0000  .0000 
R2 .201  .042  .211  
N 479 479 479 479 479 479 
Note: The table is based on data from the normal stake and high stake Russian Gift Exchange 
Experiments. Robust standard errors, clustering on sessions, are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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R1 and R2 suggest that high stakes cause no differences in wage setting and only small 
differences in effort behaviour. This raises the question to what extent our results can be 
generalized beyond the Russian context. A fully convincing answer to this question can of course 
only be given if one conducts the same experiments outside of Russia. However, if it were 
possible to show that – in the normal stake condition – Russian subjects behave similar to Non-
Russian subjects there would be little reason to believe that in the high stake condition cross-
national differences would show up. Therefore, we next turn to this question.  
 
Result 3: There is no difference in wages and effort levels across the Austrian and Russion gift 
exchange markets with normal stakes.  
 
Support for R3 is provided in Figures 3 and 4 and in Table 3. Figure 3 shows that the level and 
the time pattern of wages is very similar across Austrian and Russian GEMs. Sometimes wages 
in Austria are a bit higher, sometimes they are higher in Russia. Towards the end of the 
experiment wages are, in fact, very close to each other. This picture is also supported by 
statistical test. A Mann Whitney test, with session averages as the unit of observation, indicates 
no significant differences (p = 1.0) and if we regress individual wages on a constant and a 
dummy for Austria, the coefficient of the dummy variable is small (0.07) and highly 
insignificant (p = 0.984).  
With regard to effort behaviour a similar picture emerges. Figure 4 shows that at some 
wage intervals effort is slightly higher in Austria but these differences are not even close to 
becoming significant. In Table 3 we report our regressions results for the normal stake GEM-
sessions in Austria and Russia. Whereas the constant and the wage slope coefficient are highly 
significant the dummy variable for Austria as well as the interaction between the Austria-
dummy and the wage are insignificant – exhibiting in all cases a standard error that exceeds the 
value of the coefficient. Thus, taken together these data suggest that with regard to wages and 
effort there are no significant cross-national differences in the normal stake GEMs.  
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Figure 3: Average Wages in Russian and Austrian Normal Stake Sessions 
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Figure 4: Effort Choices in Russian and Austrian Normal Stake Sessions 
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Table 3: Effort Behaviour in gift exchange markets with normal 
stakes in Austria and Russia  
 
  (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Censored 
Regression 
 Constant 
 
-.2106*** 
(.0586) 
-.3912*** 
(.0620) 
 Wage 
 
.0094*** 
(.0011) 
.0120*** 
(.0011) 
 Austria Dummy .0822 
(.0945) 
.1237 
(.1252) 
 Austria × Wage 
 
-.0006 
(.0019) 
-.0016 
(.0022) 
 Prob > F .0002  
 Prob > Chi2  .0000 
 R2 .249  
 N 500 500 
Note: The table is based on data from the normal stake and high stake Russian 
Gift Exchange Experiments. Robust standard errors, clustering on sessions, are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
IV. Summary 
Common intuitions about the relevance of fairness motives seem to suggest that these motives 
are less important in competitive environments and in environments where large amounts of 
money are at stake. We have examined this question by conducting gift exchange experiments in 
a competitive environment under normal and under high stakes. In the high stake condition the 
stake level was ten times higher than in the normal stake condition enabling subjects to earn 
between two and tree times their monthly incomes in a two hour experiment. Despite this strong 
increase in the stake level wages in the gift exchange condition are indistinguishable across stake 
levels – exhibiting a substantial non-competitive wage premium. In sharp contrast to the high 
non-competitive wages in the gift exchange condition wages converge close to competitive 
levels when workers’ effort is exogenously fixed. This indicates that the institutional differences 
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between the gift exchange market and the complete contracts market are much more important 
than differences in stake levels.  
In the domain of effort behaviour stake levels seem to have a small impact. For wages up 
to about 60, effort tends to be slightly higher in the high stake condition while for wages above 
60 they are somewhat lower. These differences are however very small and, apparently, did not 
affect wage setting behaviour. Moreover, the combination of high stakes and experience does 
also not induce experimental workers’ to make more greedy effort choices. If anything, effort is 
higher in the high stake condition towards the end of the experiment.  
Our results and the results of Cameron (1999) suggest that up to roughly three months’ 
income the strength of fairness motives exhibits little response to stake levels. Thus, doubts 
about the external validity of fair behaviour in laboratory experiments, that are based on the 
argument that the stake level in the experiment is not sufficiently high, are not supported by the 
data – at least up to stake levels of three months income. We can, of course, not rule out that for 
stake levels beyond three months’ income stake size has a bigger behavioural impact. However, 
if one judges the relevance of our results one should ask oneself, how many daily choices 
involve more than three months’ income. We are quite confident that for most people most of 
their choices involve a substantially lower amount of resources. If one accepts this claim there is 
little basis for questioning the relevance of fairness motives for reasons of insufficient stake size 
for the bulk of people’s choices.  
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Appendix - Instructions 
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You are an employee 
 
 
General Information for Employees 
 
 
You will be taking part in a study of the labour market, financed by the Russian Academy of 
Sciences and the Austrian Science Foundation.  If you read these instructions carefully you may 
earn a considerable amount of money. During the experiment your income will be calculated in 
Guilders. At the end of the experiment Guilders will be converted into US-Dollars at the rate of: 
1 Guilder = 20  US-Cents 
At the end of the experiment your income will be paid to you in cash. 
 
The labour market has two stages. 
 
Stage 1: Each of the 15 participants will be randomly assigned to one of two groups: 9 will be 
"employees" and 6 "employers". This is known by each participant. Whether you are 
an employer or an employee is noted at the top right hand corner of this page. At the 
first stage employers offer employees wages. Employees may accept or not accept a 
wage offer. After 3 minutes the second stage begins. 
 
Stage 2: At the second stage, those workers who accepted an offer have to make a decision. 
According to the procedure described below, they determine how much they work 
(quantity of work or amount of work, respectively).  
 
Attached to these instructions you will find decision-sheets on which you must record the wage 
you have accepted. Furthermore, you will record the amount of work, which you have chosen. 
After this you will calculate the income you have earned. At this point the first period of the 
labour market will be over. Overall, there will be ten periods. Your total income for the 
participation in this market will be the sum of your earnings in each of the ten periods. 
 
How the Labour Market Works 
 
1. At the beginning of each period we will open the labour market. 
  
2. In the first stage of the labour market the employers may offer wages to the employees, and 
the employees may either accept or reject these offers. The wages offered will be written on 
the blackboard in both the employers' and employees' rooms. In total, employers and 
employees have exactly 3 minutes for trading. Every employer can make more than one 
wage offer, but each new offer must be higher than the largest offer not yet accepted. 
  
3. If an employee accepts a wage offer, then he has concluded a labour contract with the 
employer who offered this wage. An employee who wishes to accept a wage offer should 
raise his hand and say 
His Employee Number and 
the Wage he has Accepted. 
 
 For example, if Employee Number 14 accepts a wage offer of 50 Guilders, then he will 
say: 
Employee 14 accepts 50. 
 
Appendix - Instructions 
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 No employee is obliged to accept a wage offer. Any employee may conclude a labour 
contract with any of the employers, and any employer may hire any employee. However, if 
an employer and employee have concluded a labour contract these two partners are 
not allowed to conclude any further contracts in that period. 
 
4. If you accept a wage offer then you must immediately record the wage on the decision 
sheet for that period. 
 
5. If you accept a wage offer you have to bear travel costs of 20 Guilders. 
 
6. No employee will know with which employer he has concluded a contract, and no 
employer will know the employee. 
 
7. After 3 minutes the second stage begins. Those employees who accepted wage offers must 
now choose their quantity of work. We will then relay the employee's chosen quantity of 
work to "his" employer. Please do not tell anyone what quantity of work you chose. No 
other employee and no other employer will be informed about your chosen quantity of 
work. 
 
8. Those employees who did not accept any offer receive nothing in the current period. 
 
How do you Calculate Your Income in Each Period? 
 
1. If you do not accept any of the wages offered by the employers, you will receive nothing. 
 
2. If you accept a wage offer, you will receive the wage you have accepted. From this wage 
you must then subtract the travel costs and the costs of your amount of work. 
 
3. You determine your quantity of work by choosing a number between 0.1 and 1.0 from the 
schedule below. The lowest amount of work you can choose is 0.1, 0.2 is a slightly higher 
amount, and so on up to 1.0, the highest amount. 
 
4. The higher the quantity of work you choose the better it is for your employer. The higher 
the number you choose, that is, the higher the quantity of work, the higher "your" 
employer's income.  
  
5. The higher the amount of work you choose the higher your work related costs will be. You 
can find out how your costs are related to quantity of work by looking in the schedule 
below. 
 
6. If you accept a wage offer your income in Guilders will be determined by the following 
formula: 
 
Income (4) = Wage (1) - Costs of Quantity of Work (2) - Travel Costs (3). 
 
 
Schedule of feasible amounts of work (AW) and corresponding work related costs to 
employees (COST) 
 
AW 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
COST 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
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How do you Calculate the Income of Your Employer in Each Period? 
 
1. Each employer receives from the experimenter 120 coupons, which he may use to pay for 
wages. If he offers you a wage of 120 Guilders, then he will have no income coupons left. 
If he offers you a wage of 20 Guilders then he will have 100 income coupons left. In 
general, your employer will have  
120 coupons - wage 
 income coupons left. 
 
2. How are the remaining income coupons converted into Guilders? The number of coupons 
retained by the employer, whose wage offer you accepted, is multiplied by the quantity of 
work you choose. This result is the income of your employer in Guilders. Thus: 
 
Employer's Income in Guilders = Coupons Retained x Quantity of Work. 
 
3. If no employee accepts the wages offered by an employer, then this employer will earn 
nothing during that period. 
 
Please Note: The income of all employees and employers will be computed according to 
the same rules. Every employer has 120 Coupons and the work related 
cost-schedule as well as the travel costs are the same for every employee. 
Every employer is able to compute the income of "his" employee, and 
every employee is able to compute the income of "his" employer. 
 
Let's Have an Exercise 
 
1.  Let's assume that an employer, who has 120 Coupons, offers a wage of 110 Guilders which 
you accept. At the second stage of this period you choose a quantity of work of 0.5. 
What will your income and the income of your employer be? 
 My Income = .......... Guilders 
 Employer's Income = .......... Guilders 
2. Let's assume that an employer, who has 120 Coupons, offers a wage of 28 Guilders which 
you accept. At the second stage of this period you choose a quantity of work of 0.6. 
What will your income and the income of your employer be? 
 My Income = .......... Guilders 
 Employer's Income = .......... Guilders 
3. Assume that you do not accept any of the wages offered by employers. 
What will your income be? 
 My Income = .......... Guilders 
4 Assume that no wage offers of an employer are accepted by the employees. 
What will the income of this employer be? 
 Employer's Income = .......... Guilders 
 
 
Schedule of feasible amounts of work (AW) and corresponding work related costs to 
employees (COST) 
 
 
AW 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
COST 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
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Employee Number:  
 
Period Number: 
 
 
  Wage (1)  
  Amount of Work Chosen  
  Cost of Amount of Work Chosen (2)  
  Travel Costs (3)      20    Guilders 
  Your Income in Guilders (4)  
    (4) = (1) - (2) - (3) 
  .......... Guilders 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Employer's Income = (120 Coupons - Wage) x Amount of Work  
in Guilders    Chosen 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Employees will choose one of the feasible amounts of work (AW) from the first row.  The higher 
the number the higher the amount of work. 
  
The second row of the schedule shows the cost of each amount of work (COST) for the 
employee. The higher the amount of work the higher the costs to the employee. 
 
 
 
AW 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
COST 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
1 Guilder = 20 US-Cents 
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You are an employer 
 
 
General Information for Employers 
 
 
You will be taking part in a study of the labour market, financed by the Russian Academy of 
Sciences and the Austrian Science Foundation.  If you read these instructions carefully you may 
earn a considerable amount of money.  During the experiment your income will be calculated in 
Guilders.  At the end of the experiment Guilders will be converted into US-Dollars at the rate of: 
1 Guilder = 20 US-Cents 
At the end of the experiment your income will be paid to you in cash. 
 
The labour market has two stages. 
 
Stage 1: Each of the 15 participants will be randomly assigned to one of two groups:  9 will be 
"employees" and 6 "employers". This is known by each participant. Whether you are 
an employer or an employee is noted at the top right hand corner of this page. At the 
first stage employers offer employees wages.  Employees may accept or not accept a 
wage offer.  After 3 minutes the second stage begins. 
 
Stage 2: At the second stage, those workers who accepted an offer have to make a decision. 
According to the procedure described below, they determine how much they work 
(quantity of work or amount of work, respectively).  
 
Attached to these instructions you will find decision-sheets on which you must record all wages 
you have offered to the employees. Furthermore, you will record  the wage offer which has been 
accepted by an employee and the amount of work which that employee has chosen. After this you 
will calculate the income you have earned.  At this point the first period of the labour market will 
be over.  Overall, there will be ten periods.  Your total income for the participation in this market 
will be the sum of your earnings in each of the ten periods. 
 
How the Labour Market Works 
 
1. At the beginning of each period we will open the labour market. 
  
2. In the first stage of the labour market the employers may offer wages to the employees, and 
the employees may either accept or reject these offers. Wage offers must be no less than 
20 Guilders and no more than 120 Guilders. The wages offered will be written on the 
blackboard in both the employers' and employees' rooms.  In total, employers and 
employees have exactly 3 minutes for trading.  Every employer can make more than one 
wage offer, but each new offer must be higher than the largest offer not yet accepted. 
  
3. How can you, as an employer, make a wage offer?  You raise your hand and then you state: 
 
Your Employer Number and 
the Wage you are Offering. 
 
 For example, if Employer Number 14 offers a wage of 50 Guilders, then he should say: 
 
Number 14 offers 50. 
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4. If an employee accepts a wage offer then he has concluded a labour contract with the 
employer who made this offer.  No employee is obliged to accept a wage offer.  Any 
employee may make a contract with any employer, and any employer may hire any 
employee.  However, if an employer and employee have concluded a labour contract 
these two partners are not allowed to conclude any further contracts in that period. 
 
5. If an employee accepts a wage offer he has to bear travel costs of 20 Guilders. 
 
6.  If an employee accepts your wage offer then you must immediately record this wage on 
the decision sheet for that period. 
 
7. No employer will know with which employee he has made a contract, and no 
employee will know the employer. 
 
8. After 3 minutes the second stage begins. Now those employees who accepted wage offers 
must choose their quantity of work. We will then relay "your" employee's chosen quantity 
of work to you.  Please do not tell anyone what quantity of work he chose.  No other 
employee and no other employer will be informed about the quantity of work "your" 
employee has chosen. 
 
9. Those employees who did not accept a wage offer earn nothing in the current period. 
Employers whose offers are not accepted will also earn nothing for this session. 
 
How do you Calculate Your Employee's Income in Each Period? 
 
1. If an employee does not accept any of the wages offered, he will receive nothing. 
 
2. If an employee accepts a wage offer, he will receive the wage which he has accepted.  From 
this wage he must, however, subtract the travel costs of 20 Guilders and the costs of the 
quantity of work he has chosen. 
 
3. Employees determine their quantity of work by choosing a number between 0.1 and 1.0 
from the schedule below.  The lowest amount of work is 0.1, 0.2 is a slightly bigger 
amount, and so on up to 1.0, the highest amount. 
 
4. The higher the quantity of work he chooses the better for you. The higher the number he 
chooses, that is, the higher the quantity of work, the higher your income.  
 
5. The higher the quantity of work he chooses the higher his work related costs.  You can find 
out an employee's work related costs from the schedule below. 
 
6. If an employee accepts your wage offer, his income, in Guilders, will be determined by the 
following formula: 
 
Income  of  the Employee = Wage  - Costs of his Amount of Work - Travel Costs. 
 
Schedule of feasible amounts of work (AW) and corresponding work related costs to 
employees (COST) 
 
AW 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
COST 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
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How do You Calculate Your Income in Each Period? 
 
1. You will receive from us 120 Coupons, which you may use to pay wages.  If you offer a 
wage of 120 Guilders, then you will have no income coupons left.  If you offer a wage of 
20 Guilders then you will have 100 income coupons left.  In general, you will have  
120 Coupons - Wage 
 income coupons left. 
 
2. How are the remaining income coupons converted into Guilders? The number of coupons 
retained by you is multiplied by the quantity of work your employee has chosen.  The result 
is your income in Guilders.  Thus: 
 
Your Income  
in Guilders (4)  =  {Number of Coupons (1) - Wage (2)}  x  Quantity of Work (3) 
 
3. If no employee accepts the wages you offer, then you will earn nothing during that period. 
 
Please Note: The income of all employees and employers will be computed according to 
the same rules. Every employer has 120 Coupons and the work related 
cost-schedule as well as the travel costs are the same for every employee. 
Every employer is able to compute the income of "his" employee, and 
every employee is able to compute the income of "his" employer. 
 
Let's Have an Exercise 
 
1. Let's assume that you used your 120 Coupons to offer a wage of 110 Guilders which is 
accepted by an employee.  At the second stage of this period this employee chooses a 
quantity of work of 0.5. 
What will your income and the income of "your" employee be? 
 My Income = .......... Guilders 
 Employee's Income = .......... Guilders 
2. Let's assume that you used your 120 Coupons to offer a wage of 28 Guilders which is 
accepted by an employee.  At the second stage of this period this employee chooses a 
quantity of work of 0.6. 
What will  your income and the income of your employee be? 
 My Income = .......... Guilders 
 Employee's Income = .......... Guilders 
3. Assume that an employee does not accept any of the wages offered. 
What will his income be? 
 Employee's Income = .......... Guilders 
4 Assume that none of your wage offers has been accepted by an employee. 
What will your income be? 
 My Income = .......... Guilders 
 
Schedule of feasible amounts of work (AW) and corresponding work related costs to 
employees (COST) 
 
 
AW 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
COST 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
Decision Sheet for Employers 
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Employer Number:  
Period Number:  
 
Wages Offered By You 
 
           
 
           
 
 
  Number of Coupons (1)               120 
  Wage (2)  
  Amount of Work Chosen  
  by Employee (3) 
 
  Your Income in Guilders (4)  
    4 = (1 - 2) x 3 
  .......... Guilders 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Travel Costs  = 20 Guilders 
 
Employees Income = Wage - Costs of Amount of Work Chosen in 
Guilders  Travel Costs 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Employees will choose one of the feasible amounts of work (AW) from the first row.  The higher 
the number the higher the amount of work. 
 
The second row of the schedule shows the cost of each amount of work (COST) for the 
employee. The higher the amount of work the higher the costs to the employee. 
 
 
AW 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
COST 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
1 Guilder = 20 US-Cents 
